Politics Will Out

(source New York Times Tuesday, May 12, 2009)

U.S. journalist Roxana Saberi was imprisoned in Iran on ultimate charges of espionage for a sentence of eight years.  The New York Times reported on Monday that the Iranian appeals court reduced her sentence and ordered her immediate release.  The president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad wrote a letter to the court urging fairness.

Why was a letter necessary?

Is it not the job of Iran’s appeal court–indeed of ANY court–to be “fair?”  Or, is the Rule of Law something of which they need to be reminded?  I suspect the latter.  Iran is not known for its liberal legal system.  But I also strongly suspect something else.

First, she was arrested.  For what?  The original charge was for buying a bottle of wine—which is illegal in Iran, as it should be for any self-respecting Islamic theocracy.  My source didn’t mention, but it should go without saying that the purchase of illegal items must be done on, for whatever passes for it in Iran, the Black Market.  For doing this, her actions can best be described in three words;

Stupid, Stupid and Stupid.

I feel more sorry for her dealer than I do for her.  At least the Black Marketier probably did not know who she was.  Allow ME to tell you who she was.  She was;

1. A Female,
2. An American, and
3. A Journalist.

With those three strikes already against her, how could she have NO clue that she was a “subject of interest” to the government?  Put more simply; how could she NOT have minimally suspected that she was being watched??  And then, as a female, American journalist, she turns around and breaks the law and violates the religious doctrine of her host country.  Stupid, stupid person.

Then, Iran trumps up the charges.  From a stupid female American journalist buying religiously and legally prohibited alcoholic spirits on the Black Market she is suddenly transformed into an International Spy.  Bear in my mind that there is no prejudice in my mind against her gender.  We are talking about Iran here, guys.  So now from a petty criminal, she becomes the Great American Satan.

Now I ask you, was that really so unexpected?

She was in a country that is notorious for its illiberal legal system which has a BIG history of seething animosity towards the U.S..  So, while it may not have been legally fair, it is a perfectly acceptable and fair practice of war.  Let there be no doubt and no discussion, the U.S. is on the verge of, if not actually involved in, war with Iran.  It is de facto, if not de jure.  All that is missing is an actual exchange of physical hostilities—the possibility of which is still highly unpredictable.

This is diplomacy at nearly its most intense.  The tension between Iran and the West, particularly Israel and Israel’s ultimate ally the U.S., is well known.  Iran’s intent—or at the very least the capability—is thinly veiled and has been the focus of a LOT of diplomatic, propagandistic, and journalistic Hoo Rah for quite a while now.

• What can and should be done?
• What sanctions could or should the West impose?
• Just how effective would any such sanctions be?
• Will Israel launch an airstrike against nuclear production facilities as they did to Iraq during the reign of Sadaam?
• SHOULD they?
• What would be the repercussions of such a move by Israel?
• If it develops the capability, then can there be any doubt that Iran will arm itself with nuclear weapons?
• Is there any doubt, likewise, that Iran dreams of becoming a regional hegemon, especially now that its thousands of years old adversary is struggling to rebuild itself from a smoking ash heap?

Questions, Questions, Questions.  Each leads to three more and each of those leads to another three each and so on arithmetically.

But, here I am lead back to my original point about what else I suspect to be the motivations of Ahmadinejad for urging the Iranian appeals court to be “fair.”  It is but another well practiced step in the diplomatic dance among international adversaries.  It is another subtle, yet not so subtle, move in the ever intensifying game of chess.  Roxana Saberi is but an abundantly apparent pawn in the game.

It is (was) not about Saberi.  She should be fired and perhaps even spanked (for which I volunteer my services).

This is about the U.S. and Iran and conflicting interests in West Asia.  It was another opportunity for Iran to poke at the Great Satan and to gain another point in the minds of its people about how evil we are.

I wonder if I can get an interview with Roxana.  If she agrees to it, I will bring the wine.

Doc

The Tet Offensive

Series Contents;

1. The Tet Offensive
   
2. Tet: Preparing to Attack
3. Tet: Allied Defenses
4. Tet: Battle for Saigon

Part I

The Tet Offensive was a military campaign conducted by the Vietcong (opposition guerrilla army in South Vietnam) and the Army of North Vietnam beginning on the 30^th of January and ending on the 23^rd of September 1968. It was aimed at the Army of South Vietnam and the United States armed forces in the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). The purpose was to strike military and civilian control centers in South Vietnam and create a popular uprising in that country that would culminate in the fall of Saigon (capital of S. Vietnam).

It is called “Tet” because Tet is the official New Year’s Day in Vietnam. North and South Vietnam announced by radio that in honor of the most important holiday in Vietnam that there would be a two-day cease-fire. However, in the early morning hours of January 30^th (New Year’s Day) the Viet Cong began a wave of attacks in the I and II Corps Tactical Zones. At first the attacks did not cause widespread alarm or lead to extraordinary allied defensive measures. The next morning however more than 80,000 Viet Cong troops struck more than 100 towns and cities, including 36 of 44 provincial capitals, five of six autonomous cities, 72 of 245 district towns and the national capital (Saigon) itself. It was the largest military operation by either side up to that point in the war.

The South Vietnamese Army and the allied forces were surprised and stunned, but most of the attacks were successfully repulsed. The communists suffered massive causalities. There were two exceptions; the old imperial capital of Hue and the U.S. combat base at Khe Sanh where fighting lasted for more than one month and two months respectively.

President Lyndon Johnson

It was a military disaster for the Vietcong but a public relations victory. The American public and even top administration officials had come to believe that because of previous defeats that the communists were unable to launch an offensive anything close to the scope of Tet. Most Western historians concluded that Tet ended in June, but it in fact lasted through two more phases. The second began in early May and lasted until the end of the month. The third began on August 17^th and lasted until September 23^rd.

In the summer of the preceding year, General William Westmoreland (commander Military Assistance Command, Vietnam: MACV ) believed that who was winning the war could be calculated by determining the replacement rate of enemy troops. To do this he took the total number of enemy combatants in-country and subtracted the number of those eliminated. Then he added back to that the number of enemy combatants replacing those eliminated and if the first calculation was greater than the second then the conclusion was that the S Vietnamese and U.S. forces were winning.

The problem was that MACV estimates and CIA estimates differed on how many combatants were in country to begin with. The difference was 130,000. MACV estimated 300,000. The CIA estimated 430,000.

General William Westmoreland

The military routinely gave estimates of enemy strength to the press and the MACV figures that were being used. If the CIA figures were reported then that would seriously undermine the impression that was being made to the American public. The military was trying to show that the U.S. was winning the war. Giving a figure of 130,000 more than previously reported not only would make enemy troop strength and determination look stronger but also would undercut the credibility of MACV.

MACV tried to force a compromise on the CIA by insisting that they not count V.C. militias but the CIA said that was ridiculous because militias accounted for inflicting more than 50% of U.S. causalities. A final solution to the problem occurred when a report was issued using the MACV figures with an addendum at the end of the report stating CIA objections to the figures. Interagency rivalry and bureaucratic bullshit was responsible for misleading the public on the advisability of continuing the war which resulted in untold loss of additional life among American and South Vietnamese young men.

It was a decline of public support during the latter half of ’67 that upset the administration of Lyndon Johnson. 45% of the Americans polled felt that the U.S. had made a mistake in sending troops to S.E. Asia. It wasn’t because people felt that the cause was not a worthy one. It was because people were beginning to believe that it was unwinnable. Their taxes were also going up. Another poll (55%) stated that Americans wanted a stricter policy—“let’s win or get out.” So instead of concentrating on winning the war the administration concentrated on changing the public’s perception of the war. The goal was to convince the public that we were not losing but had, rather, reached a stalemate and conversely that the administration’s policies were succeeding.

The administration began pushing statistics that indicated progress; “kill ratios,” “body counts,” and “village pacification.” Vice President Hubert Humphrey went on the Today Show and stated “We are on the offensive. Territory is being gained.” And, “We are making steady progress.” President Johnson summoned General Westmoreland and U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker to Washington who claimed that the U.S. policy was creating successes in the war.

Westmoreland gave an address at the National Press Club stating that the Vietcong was “unable to mount a major offensive . . . I am absolutely certain that whereas in 1965 the enemy was winning, today he is certainly losing . . . We have reached an important point when the end begins to come into view.”

(to be continued)

Iron and Blood

If you believe that history is personality driven then the history of Germany from Bismarck to today is largely dependent on the leadership of Bismarck.  If you believe (as I do) that history is a mix of personality and events then the history of Germany is STILL dependent on his leadership.  He was a powerful dynamic man.

Otto von Bismarck quotes

Otto von Bismarck

Anyone who likes sausage and respects the law shouldn’t watch either one being made

People never lie so much as after a hunt, during a war, and before an election.

There is a providence that protects idiots, drunkards, children, and the United States of America.

The great questions of the day will not be settled by means of speeches and majority decisions but by iron and blood

Weak Strong States

This is the third in the series on the theoretical and analytical work by Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man.[1]

The first two of the series can be found here.

• The End of History and the Last Man
• Pessimism of the West

In the second installment, we discussed how liberal democracies and the political scientists that inhabit them have failed to see the rising tide of liberal democracy around the world.  We examined the reasons for this pessimism based on the failures in the middle of the 20^th century as witnessed in Nazism and Stalinism, and the seeming permanence of Soviet Communism after the fall of Stalinism and during the Cold War period.

G.W.F. Hegel

Liberal democracy was supposed to bring about the final installment of political enlightenment and herald a new and ultimate Age of Man. Inherent contradictions aside, it was supposed to put to an end the horrors of government during the millennia leading up to the establishment of the groundling democracies formed in the late 18^th century in France and the United States.

France and the United States were by no means the most liberal or democratic states that they could be at the time of their respective revolutions.  France suffered under a dictatorship for a brief period that gave rise to Napoleon’s “Empire.”  The United States still enslaved and disenfranchised substantial percentage of its population.  The point is that the dam had burst and it was felt that there would be now no going back.

Hegel was the first to propose that political socialization was a result of a “dialectical” process with each preceding form competing with present reality to form a “synthesis.”  Thesis + Antithesis = Synthesis.  New and better forms of political socialization evolved to a point where the evolution becomes complete.  To Hegel this completion found its form in liberal democracy, and therefore the “End of History.”  Hegel has been criticized for giving justification for the authoritarian regimes (particularly Nazism) in the 20^th century, but this criticism is faulty.

Karl Marx, took a page from Hegel in the use of his dialectical model and formed the basis for “Dialectical Materialism” and arrived at the conclusion that the End of History was not liberal Democracy but Communism.  Their methods were the same but the conclusions were radically different.

The failures of communism are well recorded and need not be discussed in great detail here.  The successes of liberal democracy not only continued but are spreading ever wider.  It will be the future current successes on which we will concentrate.  Before we can do that however, we must first briefly examine why liberal democracy is the form that has held on and continues to expand and why theories of “Strong” states ultimately fail.  That can be done with an examination of what Fukuyama calls the Weak Strong State.[2]

Let’s begin by defining our terms.  What do we mean by a “strong” state?  What is meant when we speak of “weak” states?

A strong state is one who, by definition, is able to control its political organization and permanence through strict control of the political system.  A strong state tells the people unequivocally who the political are and will be without leaving a choice for leaders to be replaced by a democratic process.  A tool to accomplish this is by strict restriction of liberal policies or rights-rights such as speech, association, and privacy.  All this, again by definition, makes the political structure of such states “illiberal” and “undemocratic.”

The trade-off for the loss of democratic and liberal rights is security.  The people give up these things (theoretically) in exchange for social and economic stability.  It pays here to mention that besides personal liberalness that we can also speak of “economic” liberality where the contrast is between an economy that is allowed to grow and flourish (with some restrictions) on the one hand and an economy that is rigidly controlled and restricted by the state political apparatus on the other.

The “weak” state, on the other hand, is the liberal-democratic state.  It is perceived as weak because the political structure is seen as unstable.  Social and economic security is not as certain as in the strong state because the political environment is not as tightly controlled.  Personal liberties are unrestricted which gives possible rise to uncontrolled outbursts of public sentiment over public dissatisfaction.  Leaders and parties can be changed through the democratic process.  Economic liberalism gives rise to class inequalities and poverty, because of the inequities of capitalism.

The liberal-democratic state though is not weak.  It is strong for the very reasons that it is presupposed to be weak.  It is the very liberal/democratic nature of the political and social process that gives the state the ultimate legitimacy upon which it rests its authority.  It is a state that respects the rights of its population and allows the people, not the government, to decide what should be done when difficulties arise.

Strength or viability therefore rests on the legitimacy of the regime.  Legitimacy is the degree of faith that is placed in the state.  All states, liberal-democratic or otherwise must have some measure of legitimacy to begin with in order to last any length of time.  The greater the degree, the greater the viability.

A strict authoritarian state such as Nazi Germany held a certain degree of legitimacy or else it would not have been

able to rise to the power that it held at its zenith.  No ruler, not even Adolph Hitler can rule solely by force over an entire nation of people.  He needed supporters who believed that he was the best possible choice for running the country and therefore gave their allegiance to him.  It was in his counselors and generals therefore that Hitler and therefore Nazism found legitimacy.  This elite supporting group therefore were available to carry out his commands through their subordinates who similarly gave legitimacy to their leaders.  It was an authoritarian (and very nearly totalitarian) state.  Liberal rights were severely curtailed and of course there was no democratic action.

Nazism, fortunately, was proved illegitimate through force of arms.  A great many horrors were committed before it was brought down and it is equally certain that a great many more would have occurred had it not been defeated militarily.  But, even if it had survived, it could not have endured.  It’s ideology rested on the idea of the superiority of race and the racial right to rule.  To remain legitimate it would have had to constantly been in armed international conflict.  If it had won, then its reason for being would have been eliminated and it would have either collapsed completely or the form of government would have had to violently change.  Violently, because in a system of authoritarian repression, any conflicting ideal would have to be brutally put down.

Soviet communism is a different matter and its persistence, among other things, gave justification for the western pessimism mentioned earlier in this essay and in the second in the series, “Pessimism of the West.”

Authoritarianism differs from Totalitarianism in one crucial respect.  Authoritarianism controls the political/social culture but mainly the political structure.  Authoritarianism allows some social structures to remain either unchanged or with restrictions.  Totalitarianism controls all spheres of life, both political and social.  Therefore, an authoritarian government may allow religious practice even if it is only the state approved religion.  Totalitarian government abolishes ALL religion.  Religion becomes the worship of the state itself.  Authoritarian government may allow state censored press and other media.  Totalitarian government owns and operates the media.  There is no need for censorship because all you are going to absorb from the media is strictly what the government puts out for consumption.  Totalitarianism is 100% all-encompassing.

Animal Farm was about an authoritarian government.  1984 was about totalitarianism.  When an authoritarian government finally loses its legitimacy it is more likely to ease its way into liberal-democracy because there are structures already in place to ease the transition.  When totalitarianism collapses it is more like to collapse completely because there is nothing ready-made on which to form a consensus of acceptable social interaction.  When the state goes, so does everything the state represented.

This therefore is a good explanation of why supposedly strong states are in fact weak and why the truly states of liberal-democracies are not only the best representations of what has become the End of History and why they are sure to endure.  Next in the series will be discussed what Fukuyama calls the “Worldwide Liberal Revolution.”

C.E. Spots

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[1] Frances Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).  Second paperback edition.

[2] ibid.  13-38

Iceland’s New Prime Minister

On January 31, Iceland got a new Prime Minister, Johanna Sigurdardottir.  She is openly lesbian.

The new P.M. is a gay woman whose determination and perseverance have set her apart from others in the tiny nation’s government, a woman who once formed her own party before recommitting to the Social Democratic Alliance.

With Sigurdardottir having taken the reigns of national leadership and Iceland headed toward membership in the European Union, the promise of hope for a nation beset by deep economic woes–and the Jan. 26 fall of a government that had lost the trust of its people–far outweigh the sexual orientation of the new leader.

Even so, Sigurdardottir’s assumption of the role of Prime Minister marks an historic step forward: never before has an openly GLBT individual been prime minister of a nation.

This is perhaps bigger news to the rest of the world than it is to the tiny nation of less than 350,000 citizens.

She may also be the only world leader to like Bush.

No he didn’t, did he?

Pessimism of the West

Pessimism of the West

This is the second in the series of essays, reviews and commentaries on The End of History and the Last Man by Francis Fukuyama.[1]

• The End of History and the Last Man

In the first of the series we discussed the premise that the end of history is being demonstrated by the wide spread acceptance of Liberal Democracy as the government of choice around the world.  We discussed the concept that what is meant by the “end of history” is not the end of events or even great and significant moments in world politics.  It is merely a statement that the events of history up until now have led to this point that we have finally reached and are accepting an ideal and universal form of world government.  Before we can go any further we must address the history of the alternatives to Liberal Democracy and why it has not been more widely accepted that this is the inevitable form of the ideal Social Contract.

Fukuyama calls this non-acceptance of the goodness and inevitable triumph of Liberal Democracy “Our Pessimism.[2] In the west we have been pessimistic about achieving a final form of universally acceptable government because of the witness of the past 100 years.  The horrors of World War I, the bloody scourges of Stalinism, the death camps of Hitler, “total war” encompassing the wholesale destruction of civilian populations and resources-all these things disproved what was believed earlier that the progress and civilization of man would remove from our history the barbarities of our ancestors.  Indeed, it was these very progresses that enabled evil to find more ultimate ways to express itself.

Liberal Democracy was confronted by two challengers to the “preferred” method of government-Communism and Fascism.  Fascism, under the Nazis, was defeated by force of arms.  Soviet Communism continued and became the main challenger to the Liberal ideal.  In our own times, it became widely accepted that the Soviet regime was not only here to stay, but that it was even an acceptable alternative.  It appeared to have legitimacy for the Soviet people.  They were apparently willing to trade liberal democratic practices for the security promised by the Soviet state.  But it was not legitimate as was quickly proved when the Soviet Union disintegrated in the late 1980s-early 90s.

The collapse came as a total surprise to the west.  Secretary of State Henry Kissinger as late as the 1970s expressed the views of most western political scientists when he said,

. . . today, for the first time in our history, we face the stark reality that the communist challenge is unending . . . We must learn to conduct foreign policy as other nations have had to conduct it for so many centuries-without escape and without respite. . . . This condition will not go away.

Jeanne Kirkpatrick, who later served on the National Security Council and was the first female U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, wrote a famous article in 1979 comparing right-wing Authoritarian governments to left-wing (communist) Totalitarian governments.  She provided that authoritarian governments  were susceptible to democracy and liberalization but there was no provision given for change on the left.  Totalitarian regimes (in contrast to authoritarian) controlled their populaces so ruthlessly by expropriating every form of social intercourse including previously internalized values and traditions, that they were therefore rendered virtually immune reform.

The history of this century provide no grounds for expecting that radical totalitarian regimes will transform themselves.

All of our best and brightest were proved incredibly wrong when it finally happened.

Liberalism and Democracy are not necessary partners.  A country can be liberal without being democratic, and it can be democratic without being liberal, but because of our pessimism it was felt for a long time that we would not see both coming together in countries currently under the sway of the left or the right.  Our world would be evil upon evil without end, amen.  The horrors of the twentieth century destroyed our belief in the inexorable goodness of men and our rational western philosophies left us incapable of defending any other view.

But, as stated, we were wrong.  And we were wrong for a variety of reasons but the most important one is that other forms of government besides Liberal Democracy are confronted by inherent contradictions that sooner or later erode the legitimacy which is necessary to constitute a civil society of whatever stripe.

Please note that this is not to say that there are no contradictions in the theory and/or practice of liberal democracy or economy.  There are more than a few.  What this IS to say is that in a Liberal Democracy there are institutional remedies through both the liberal and the democratic processes with which these contradictions are addressed.  The ability to correct contradictions  therefore leaves intact the legitimacy of the government which it needs to exist and operate.

Liberal Democratic states are visibly weak, but are inherently strong in this respect.  Next we will examine the forms of government that are visibly strong, but suffer invisible inherent weakness.

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[1] Frances Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).  Second paperback edition.

[2] Ibid. 3

Ready, Set

I went to Barnes and Noble today and got fresh paper copies of the New York Times, The Economist, and Foreign Affairs.  I also got a copy of Samuel P. Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order to supplement my readings and series on The End of History and the Last Man.

Are you Ready?

I’m Set.

(somebody say “GO!” )

c.e.s.

(but first I’m going to take a nap.  )

Misnomer

There is no such geographical location as the “Middle East.”  It’s “West Asia” folks. 

East Asia

West Asia

Additionally, If you can refer to Japan, Korea, Vietnam, etc as the FAR East (Asia) then it is proper to refer to Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, et. al. as FAR West.

Sound picky?  Not really.  Not when you consider the sensitivity of some people when East Asians are referred to as “Oriental.”  If you are politically incorrect to use the word “Oriental,” then you should refer to what is popularly called the Middle East as West Asia.  This should be done to properly differentiate between the vastly different cultures of the eastern and western portions of the continent.

Personally, I prefer “Oriental.”  It quickly identifies the culture to which I am referring.  All “Oriental” means folks is “Eastern.”  Really, look it up.   To “Orient” oneself on a map, the word means to find “east.”  I also got used to “Middle East” but I’ve been getting hassled about “Oriental” so that means you have to use “West Asia.”

Maybe I’m being a little picky after all.  But I’m 50+ and therefore assert a perogative of age. 

g.

The End of History and the Last Man

The End of History and the Last Man

This will begin a series of essays and commentaries on The End of History and the Last Man[1] by noted political scientist Francis Fukuyama.  Continuance of the series will depend on popularity of them in this blog.  Popularity will be judged on post views and comments left.  No small percentage will be given to comments given.  It is my hope that this will stimulate interest in the subject and conversation on what has been presented here.  Footnotes are provided for appropriate citation and may be followed by clicking on the footnote number within the text.  This first post will be by way of introduction to the topic and the man.

 Francis Fukuyama is a Bernard L. Schwartz professor of international political economy at John Hopkins University and is a member of the President’s Council for Bioethics.  He has twice served on the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. Department of State.  In 1981-82 he was a member of the U.S. delegation to the Egyptian-Israeli talks on Palestinian autonomy.  It is also noteworthy and will be mentioned later, that he was a student of political scientist Samuel P. Huntington.

In The End of History, Fukuyama argues that the evolution of political ideology has come to an end with the widespread acceptance of Liberal Democracy.  He notes with importance that a shared definition of “history” is prerequisite to the most basic understanding of his thesis.  The end of history is not the end of time, nor is it the end to events of greater and/or lesser political importance.

Rather, he argues that “liberal democracy constitutes the endpoint of mankind’s ideological evolution and the final form of human government, and as such constitutes the end of history[2].”

Hegel and Marx both viewed history in a similar light and posited that there would come a point in which mankind’s longings for political satisfaction would be met.  For Marx it was the communist state.  For Hegel it was the liberal democratic state.  We may relapse into authoritarian forms of government but the inexorable trend toward liberal democracy is just that, inexorable and will eventually ideologically overwhelm all other philosophies of government.  The reasons he gives for this advance are dependent on two variables;

• Economics, and
• The ’struggle for recognition.”

We. In the west, have become extremely pessimistic about the possibilities presented by this belief.  Our pessimism is based on the horrors and atrocities we witnessed in the 20^th century.  And no less, perhaps, by the upsurge in international terrorism most poignantly demonstrated in the September 11^th attacks on the World Trade Center in NYC and the Pentagon in Washington D.C.  However the lessons we should have taken from these tragic events is that, fundamentally there are glaring contradictions and weaknesses in seemingly strong dictatorship, be they of the Left or the Right.

Much commentary and criticism comes from Fukuyama’s acquaintaincship with Samuel Huntington, in light of Huntington’s own work, The Clash of Civilizations and the remaking of the world Order.  Huntington speaks of a much different theory that Fukuyama presents.  Huntington postulates that far from being the end of history, what we see emerging in the political world order is conflicting cultures and ideologies clashing along geographic “fault lines.”

In the following essays here in the Aerie, we will concentrate on Fukuyama’s end of history hypothesis, that liberal democracy is not only here to stay, but that it encapsulates the pinnacle of human desire for government.

c.e.s.

The two links here for Samuel Huntington will take you to two separate locations.

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[1] Frances Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).  Second paperback edition.

[2] Ibid.  xi