Series Contents;
- The Tet Offensive
- Tet: Preparing to Attack
- Tet: Allied Defenses
- Tet: Battle for Saigon
Part I
The Tet Offensive was a military campaign conducted by the Vietcong (opposition guerrilla army in South Vietnam) and the Army of North Vietnam beginning on the 30th of January and ending on the 23rd of September 1968. It was
aimed at the Army of South Vietnam and the United States armed forces in the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). The purpose was to strike military and civilian control centers in South Vietnam and create a popular uprising in that country that would culminate in the fall of Saigon (capital of S. Vietnam).
It is called “Tet” because Tet is the official New Year’s Day in Vietnam. North and South Vietnam announced by radio that in honor of the most important holiday in Vietnam that there would be a two-day cease-fire. However, in the early morning hours of January 30th (New Year’s Day) the Viet Cong began a wave of attacks in the I and II Corps Tactical Zones. At first the attacks did not cause widespread alarm or lead to extraordinary allied defensive measures. The next morning however more than 80,000 Viet Cong troops struck more than 100 towns and cities, including 36 of 44 provincial capitals, five of six autonomous cities, 72 of 245 district towns and the national capital (Saigon) itself. It was the largest military operation by either side up to that point in the war.
The South Vietnamese Army and the allied forces were surprised and stunned, but most of the attacks were successfully repulsed. The communists suffered massive causalities. There were two exceptions; the old imperial capital of Hue and the U.S. combat base at Khe Sanh where fighting lasted for more than one month and two months respectively.

President Lyndon Johnson
It was a military disaster for the Vietcong but a public relations victory. The American public and even top administration officials had come to believe that because of previous defeats that the communists were unable to launch an offensive anything close to the scope of Tet. Most Western historians concluded that Tet ended in June, but it in fact lasted through two more phases. The second began in early May and lasted until the end of the month. The third began on August 17th and lasted until September 23rd.
In the summer of the preceding year, General William Westmoreland (commander Military Assistance Command, Vietnam: MACV ) believed that who was winning the war could be calculated by determining the replacement rate of enemy troops. To do this he took the total number of enemy combatants in-country and subtracted the number of those eliminated. Then he added back to that the number of enemy combatants replacing those eliminated and if the first calculation was greater than the second then the conclusion was that the S Vietnamese and U.S. forces were winning.
The problem was that MACV estimates and CIA estimates differed on how many combatants were in country to begin with. The difference was 130,000. MACV estimated 300,000. The CIA estimated 430,000.

General William Westmoreland
The military routinely gave estimates of enemy strength to the press and the MACV figures that were being used. If the CIA figures were reported then that would seriously undermine the impression that was being made to the American public. The military was trying to show that the U.S. was winning the war. Giving a figure of 130,000 more than previously reported not only would make enemy troop strength and determination look stronger but also would undercut the credibility of MACV.
MACV tried to force a compromise on the CIA by insisting that they not count V.C. militias but the CIA said that was ridiculous because militias accounted for inflicting more than 50% of U.S. causalities. A final solution to the problem occurred when a report was issued using the MACV figures with an addendum at the end of the report stating CIA objections to the figures. Interagency rivalry and bureaucratic bullshit was responsible for misleading the public on the advisability of continuing the war which resulted in untold loss of additional life among American and South Vietnamese young men.
It was a decline of public support during the latter half of ’67 that upset the administration of Lyndon Johnson. 45% of the Americans polled felt that the U.S. had made a mistake in sending troops to S.E. Asia. It wasn’t because people felt that the cause was not a worthy one. It was because people were beginning to believe that it was unwinnable. Their taxes were also going up. Another poll (55%) stated that Americans wanted a stricter policy—“let’s win or get
out.” So instead of concentrating on winning the war the administration concentrated on changing the public’s perception of the war. The goal was to convince the public that we were not losing but had, rather, reached a stalemate and conversely that the administration’s policies were succeeding.
The administration began pushing statistics that indicated progress; “kill ratios,” “body counts,” and “village pacification.” Vice President Hubert Humphrey went on the Today Show and stated “We are on the offensive. Territory is being gained.” And, “We are making steady progress.” President Johnson summoned General Westmoreland and U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker to Washington who claimed that the U.S. policy was creating successes in the war.
Westmoreland gave an address at the National Press Club stating that the Vietcong was “unable to mount a major offensive . . . I am absolutely certain that whereas in 1965 the enemy was winning, today he is certainly losing . . . We have reached an important point when the end begins to come into view.”
(to be continued)
The Tet Offensive
Posted by Dr. Spots on February 23, 2009
Series Contents;
Part I
The Tet Offensive was a military campaign conducted by the Vietcong (opposition guerrilla army in South Vietnam) and the Army of North Vietnam beginning on the 30th of January and ending on the 23rd of September 1968. It was
aimed at the Army of South Vietnam and the United States armed forces in the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). The purpose was to strike military and civilian control centers in South Vietnam and create a popular uprising in that country that would culminate in the fall of Saigon (capital of S. Vietnam).
It is called “Tet” because Tet is the official New Year’s Day in Vietnam. North and South Vietnam announced by radio that in honor of the most important holiday in Vietnam that there would be a two-day cease-fire. However, in the early morning hours of January 30th (New Year’s Day) the Viet Cong began a wave of attacks in the I and II Corps Tactical Zones. At first the attacks did not cause widespread alarm or lead to extraordinary allied defensive measures. The next morning however more than 80,000 Viet Cong troops struck more than 100 towns and cities, including 36 of 44 provincial capitals, five of six autonomous cities, 72 of 245 district towns and the national capital (Saigon) itself. It was the largest military operation by either side up to that point in the war.
The South Vietnamese Army and the allied forces were surprised and stunned, but most of the attacks were successfully repulsed. The communists suffered massive causalities. There were two exceptions; the old imperial capital of Hue and the U.S. combat base at Khe Sanh where fighting lasted for more than one month and two months respectively.
President Lyndon Johnson
It was a military disaster for the Vietcong but a public relations victory. The American public and even top administration officials had come to believe that because of previous defeats that the communists were unable to launch an offensive anything close to the scope of Tet. Most Western historians concluded that Tet ended in June, but it in fact lasted through two more phases. The second began in early May and lasted until the end of the month. The third began on August 17th and lasted until September 23rd.
In the summer of the preceding year, General William Westmoreland (commander Military Assistance Command, Vietnam: MACV ) believed that who was winning the war could be calculated by determining the replacement rate of enemy troops. To do this he took the total number of enemy combatants in-country and subtracted the number of those eliminated. Then he added back to that the number of enemy combatants replacing those eliminated and if the first calculation was greater than the second then the conclusion was that the S Vietnamese and U.S. forces were winning.
The problem was that MACV estimates and CIA estimates differed on how many combatants were in country to begin with. The difference was 130,000. MACV estimated 300,000. The CIA estimated 430,000.
General William Westmoreland
The military routinely gave estimates of enemy strength to the press and the MACV figures that were being used. If the CIA figures were reported then that would seriously undermine the impression that was being made to the American public. The military was trying to show that the U.S. was winning the war. Giving a figure of 130,000 more than previously reported not only would make enemy troop strength and determination look stronger but also would undercut the credibility of MACV.
MACV tried to force a compromise on the CIA by insisting that they not count V.C. militias but the CIA said that was ridiculous because militias accounted for inflicting more than 50% of U.S. causalities. A final solution to the problem occurred when a report was issued using the MACV figures with an addendum at the end of the report stating CIA objections to the figures. Interagency rivalry and bureaucratic bullshit was responsible for misleading the public on the advisability of continuing the war which resulted in untold loss of additional life among American and South Vietnamese young men.
It was a decline of public support during the latter half of ’67 that upset the administration of Lyndon Johnson. 45% of the Americans polled felt that the U.S. had made a mistake in sending troops to S.E. Asia. It wasn’t because people felt that the cause was not a worthy one. It was because people were beginning to believe that it was unwinnable. Their taxes were also going up. Another poll (55%) stated that Americans wanted a stricter policy—“let’s win or get
out.” So instead of concentrating on winning the war the administration concentrated on changing the public’s perception of the war. The goal was to convince the public that we were not losing but had, rather, reached a stalemate and conversely that the administration’s policies were succeeding.
The administration began pushing statistics that indicated progress; “kill ratios,” “body counts,” and “village pacification.” Vice President Hubert Humphrey went on the Today Show and stated “We are on the offensive. Territory is being gained.” And, “We are making steady progress.” President Johnson summoned General Westmoreland and U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker to Washington who claimed that the U.S. policy was creating successes in the war.
Westmoreland gave an address at the National Press Club stating that the Vietcong was “unable to mount a major offensive . . . I am absolutely certain that whereas in 1965 the enemy was winning, today he is certainly losing . . . We have reached an important point when the end begins to come into view.”
(to be continued)
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